In "Brawn & Brains" (Forbes, 9/15/03) Peter Huber and Mark Mills look at the 2003 Power Blackout. Although investment in the grid is important, they point out that it was not particularly stressed on August 14. The failure developed over an hour-long period and the final crisis unfolded in nine seconds ... a long time in the power management business. They see this as good news, because such problems can be addressed by short-term investment in better "Scada" networks.
In a white paper referenced in the article, the authors also argue that the electrical network, designed to be robust in the face of random failures, is vulnerable to targeted sabotage on key elements. They have a list of recommended steps. (More ... )
The Scada ("supervisory control and data acquisition") networks are the brains that steer the waves of power and "reactive" power that wash through the electrical grid, especially in times of high trading volume and rougue failure states. Recent advances in Scada technology allow a much "smarter" grid than was possible even 5 or 10 years ago, say Huber and Mills. Replacing older electro-mechanical switches with higher-power silicon switches can provide faster, more reliable and more precise power control, as they now do at military installations. They leave us with the public policy question: will power suppliers and transmitters get the economic incentives to invest in this new technology?
In a white paper published by their consulting firm, the Digital Power Group They discuss detailed suggestions for improvement, outlined in eight major areas for coordinated action by policy makers, industry associations and end users:
1. Assess Vulnerabilities
2. Establish Critical-Power Standards for Facilities Used to Support Key Government Functions
3. Share Safety- and Performance-Related Information, Best Practices, and Standards
4. Interconnect Public and Private Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Networks
5. Secure Automated Control Systems
6. Share Assets
7. Enhance Interfaces Between On-Site Generating Capacity and The Public Grid
8. Remove Obstacles
Peter Huber (a Manhattan Institute senior fellow), and Mark Mills are partners in the Digital Power Group and authors of the August 2003 white paper "Critical Power" (2003) There, they suggest that the grid was designed for power quality and short-term reliability. Its design makes it resistant to random failures scattered throughout the network. It was not designed for targeted attacks on critical nodes that may result in extended periods of downtime for significant network assets.
Since 9/11/01, such possibilities seem less remote. In the paper, Huber and Mills indicate that it needs to be improved to assure continuity during extended outages, including those that may result from deliberate sabotage, and that such requires different approaches to technology and investment.
DougSimpson.com/blog