September 11, 2005
In 1993, GAO Forecast Inadequacy of Civil Authority in a Serious Catastrophe
GAO/RCED-93-186: DISASTER MANAGEMENT Improving the Nation’s Response to Catastrophic Disasters (July 1993): from the Executive Summary and body of the study:
"The nation’s management of catastrophic disasters was intensely criticized after Hurricane Andrew leveled much of South Florida and Hurricane Iniki destroyed much of the Hawaiian island of Kauai in 1992. Prior to these storms, other major disasters, such as Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, also generated intense criticism of the federal response effort. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead federal agency for disaster management, responds to many smaller natural disasters every year without extensive public scrutiny. Unlike the bulk of the disasters requiring FEMA to respond, however, catastrophic disasters overwhelm the ability of state, local, and voluntary agencies to adequately provide victims with essential services, such as food and water, within 12 to 24 hours. The response to Hurricane Andrew raised doubts about whether FEMA is capable of responding to catastrophic disasters and whether it had learned any lessons from its responses to Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake.
(read more)
Congressional requesters asked us to examine the adequacy of the federal strategy for responding to catastrophic disasters and to develop solutions for improving it. Since January of this year, we have presented the results of our work at hearings before five Senate and House Committees and Subcommittees.’ This report summarizes our analyses, conclusions, recommendations, and matters for congressional consideration presented at those hearings."
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"The federal strategy for responding to catastrophic disasters is deficient because it lacks provisions for the federal government to immediately (1) assess in a comprehensive manner the damage and the corresponding needs of disaster victims and (2) provide food, shelter, and other essential services when the needs of disaster victims outstrip the resources of the state, local, and private voluntary community."
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"To improve the federal response, the nation needs presidential involvement and leadership both before and after a catastrophic disaster strikes. To underscore the commitment of the President, responsibility for catastrophic disaster preparedness and response should be placed with a key official in the White House. This would institutionalize the direct presidential involvement that occurred on an ad hoc basis in Hurricane Andrew and other recent major disasters. Furthermore, this organizational arrangement could increase the levels of attention given to emergency management responsibilities throughout the government, not just in times of catastrophic disasters. This responsibility should not be a full-time position that would effectively duplicate the role of the Director of FEMA, but the White House official should be sufficiently knowledgeable about disaster response to guide the federal effort."
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"For all but the most severe catastrophic disasters, the Red Cross and its large network of volunteers may be well suited to provide mass care and coordinate the efforts of other federal agencies, as was the case with Hurricane Andrew in Louisiana. In South Florida, the Red Cross also responded to the needs of Hurricane Andrew’s victims-sheltering those who evacuated South Florida and providing some mass care after the storm. However, the enormous gap between the immediate need and available private voluntary resources in South Florida was inevitable for a disaster of this magnitude."
... "For such disasters, DOD is the only organization capable of providing, transporting, and distributing sufficient quantities of the items needed"
This GAO report, indicating the essential role of speedy Department of Defense response to a disaster of the scale of Katrina, was published twelve years ago, following an outcry about the slow, uncoordinated government response to the Hurricane Andrew disaster.
During Katrina, on Sunday, federal officials were warned the levees would be topped. On Monday morning at 8 AM, Mayor Nagin told the Today Show that the levees had been topped in the early morning hours. The New York Times reported on September 11 that before dawn on Monday, August 29, the state police reported to the Corps. of Engineers that the 17th Street levee had broken, draining Lake Pontchartrain into New Orleans. "Delays Were Deadly After Katrina Struck: Levee Breached at 3 A.M.; Was Reported at 6 P.M." New York Times, September 11, 2005, p. A15. See also: NOLA.com: Hurricane Center.
On September 4, Tim Russert interviewed Chertoff, who said he did not learn of the levee break until midday Tuesday, over 24 hours later: “It was on Tuesday that the levee–may have been overnight Monday to Tuesday–that the levee started to break. And it was midday Tuesday that I became aware of the fact that there was no possibility of plugging the gap and that essentially the lake was going to start to drain into the city.” Transcript for September 4 - Meet the Press, online at MSNBC - MSNBC.com
What was the Secretary of Defense doing while floodwaters inundated the poor and helpless in New Orleans?
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld enjoys himself while attending the game between the San Diego Padres and Arizona Diamondbacks Monday, Aug. 29, 2005, in San Diego. (AP Photo/Lenny Ignelzi)
Hurricane Katrina revealed that the same problems still exist, with chilling similarity. Hearings and studies will do nothing if we continue failing to execute on their recommendations and making bad choices about public safety.
Think Progress » KATRINA TIMELINE
Posted by dougsimpson at September 11, 2005 07:53 AM